Trump and Bismarck in the Same Sentence
文章深入探讨了特朗普政府在霍尔木兹海峡危机中的独特策略，将其与美国传统的卡特主义外交政策进行对比。作者认为，特朗普可能有意将霍尔木兹海峡的安保责任从美国转变为全球性问题，从而改变各方（包括伊朗、中国及欧洲能源消费国）的利益考量和行动激励。通过这种“制造混乱”的方式，美国可能在不直接升级冲突的情况下，促使国际社会对伊朗施压。文章还指出，伊朗政权目前正经历严重的内部动荡和经济困境，这可能为特朗普的策略带来意想不到的转机，甚至可能导致伊朗政权的垮台。尽管特朗普的策略看似非传统且伴随风险，但其可能利用美国优越的战略地位，最终实现其目标。
Otto von Bismarck’s special providence for “fools, drunks, and the United States of America” may be coming to the aid of the current incumbent.
俾斯麦的这句名言“上帝特别眷顾傻瓜、醉汉和美利坚合众国”常被引用来形容美国在国际事务中似乎总能逢凶化吉的独特地位。在此文中，作者暗示特朗普政府可能也受益于这种“特殊眷顾”，即使其策略看似混乱。
TACO—“Trump always chickens out”—was never a slur but a prayer in the financial markets where it was coined. Donald Trump didn’t arrive on his own at his Wednesday night claim that the Strait of Hormuz would open “naturally” once the shooting stops. Markets already believed salvation was going to come quicker from Mr. Trump standing down than from him escalating. The U.S. is perfectly capable of escalating, of course, albeit not at a cost that likely interests the president.
The alternative? If the U.S. stands down, the strait no longer is a U.S. problem. It becomes the world’s problem—and Iran’s.
The strait isn’t leverage over the U.S. if the U.S. doesn’t care. If Iran continues to threaten the trade of noncombatant nations, Mr. Trump might even find himself entreated to rejoin the fight. Hydrocarbon customers in Europe and Asia might demand he renew his potent threat to attack Iran’s own export facilities.
The incentive needles for Iran shift 180 degrees. Its key patron, China, gets less than 2 millions barrels a day from Tehran—and 9 million from other Gulf countries currently shut in. China’s own export-led recovery screeches to a halt if importing nations are in recession or depression thanks to the Hormuz shutdown.
文章指出，中国从伊朗进口的石油远少于从其他海湾国家，这意味着霍尔木兹海峡若关闭，对中国经济的冲击将主要来自全球油价上涨和贸易中断，而非直接的伊朗供应中断。这为中国在海峡问题上的立场提供了经济考量。
If a Danish frigate decides to sail through the strait after the war ends, is Iran going to start a new war with NATO?
Four-dimensional chess isn’t what I’m alleging. Mr. Trump creates chaos and America’s blessed superior strategic position lets it sail through and gives him options.
He miscalculated on several fronts, but incipiently between the lines of his Iran gambit seem to be recurrent Trump objectives (and crotchets) regarding allies, energy and trade. Or maybe not so incipiently, according to maritime analyst John Konrad, in his widely read essay partly titled, “What If the U.S. Navy isn’t in a Hurry to Reopen the Strait?
Here we need a note for the press. “Strategy” isn’t listing your desirables. “Strategy” is explaining how you intend to find or create the leverage to realize them.
Mr. Trump has made clear he doesn’t want to be the neutral protector of the Gulf, upholder of what became known in 1980 as the Carter Doctrine. The doctrine was really a rephrasing of a longer-standing U.S. commitment to protect Western energy supplies from an invading rival superpower, and not—as Mr. Trump is discovering in a crisis that he himself instigated—from a rampaging local actor.
卡特主义是1980年美国总统吉米·卡特提出的外交政策，声明美国将使用任何必要手段（包括军事力量）保护其在波斯湾的重大利益。文章指出，该主义最初旨在对抗苏联等外部大国威胁，而非应对伊朗这类区域性行动者的挑战。
Nine countries, at any time, could use their Persian and Oman Gulf shoreline to frighten risk-averse captains and insurers from using the strait. In a 1984 HBO docudrama, it was Oman, after a left-wing coup, that blocked traffic and demanded tolls as Iran now is doing.
Iran alone overlooks 1,483 miles of the now-contested waters and still accounts for only about one-third of the vector from which potential risk might come, depending on who’s in charge of which Gulf nation. The U.S. intended to deter Soviet tanks assaulting from the north or Egypt. The U.S. didn’t plan to police thousands of miles of coastline and hinterland. It didn’t mean to substitute itself for what self-interest, mutual deterrence and the world’s eagerness to hand over trillions of dollars should do: keep locals aligned around free passage and ready to restore it swiftly after an interruption.
Mr. Trump’s own ambition is simpler—to cozy up to local potentates and add their energy power to America’s (while putting up some Trump Towers). At the moment, this scheme has been tempered by factors he didn’t reckon on. Iran didn’t fold the way he hoped. Mr. Trump is a lame duck, with low approvals and a surplus of voter distrust, likely ruling out a ground-troops option. You go to war—or not—with the president you have. The leverage Mr. Trump lacks isn’t with Iran, it’s with the American people.
But another variable may yet prove relevant to the timeline of his remaining presidency, which hasn’t quite three years to run. Iran’s regime is shakier than it has been in decades. It massacred 30,000 of its most vibrant citizens. Its economy is imploding. Its leadership has been culled of its most experienced (and bought-off) members by Israel’s decapitation strikes.
文章强调伊朗政权正经历数十年来最严重的动荡，包括大规模镇压异见者、经济崩溃以及高级官员被清除。这种内部脆弱性可能成为影响特朗普政府对伊策略结果的关键变量，甚至可能导致政权更迭。
Allah’s decrepit and corrupt representatives on earth wouldn’t seem to have a long-term lease no matter what Mr. Trump does next. Hang on to your hats. The president has signaled U.S. air strikes will end in two or three weeks—while, importantly, the world still has plenty of oil in strategic reserve. Don’t be too shocked if 10 million Iranians come out into the streets to celebrate the end of the war and continue to celebrate until the regime is gone.